Last two months of border (it is called Line of actual control) standoff and hand-to-hand combat has led to lots of purposeful (through application of mind) & auto-generated (emotional) reactions & theories on plausible causes for China’s actions - that of changing status quo on Sino-Indian line of actual control, especially in the Ladakh sector.
Hundreds of air-time hours & gigabytes of geo-strategists, ambassadors & analysts can be summed up into five analytical categories – (i) Tactical[1], (ii) Strategic[2], (iii) Psycho-economical[3], (iv) Reactionary[4], (v) Habitual[5].
I propose you to attend to each of the below mentioned case-categories & consider each brief analysis I have provided along for the 16 presented cases. You are welcome to provide your critique in comments section. The only assumption I have made in the process of my analysis is that Chinese leadership, strategy & policy-makers are very clever & shrewd strategists. Any other contrarian assumption should be made on one’s own peril. Therefore, all such instances, which showcase apparent folly in strategy, have been excluded as possibilities. It is also very important to chaff off causes from effects. China controls causes, effects do not yield to any control. This is apparent from China getting a bloody nose in Galwan valley on the night of 15th June 2020.
Other equally important detail which should not escape attention is that single point agendas are undertaken in personal animosities, nations (like China) undertake high risk actions, only if the strategy foresees multiple-facets, is multi-pronged & very often incorporates opposing, but beneficial anticipated effects for the impacting party (China), such manner that the effected party (India) losses something (tangible or intangible), irrespective of whether it chooses to act one way or other (in this case - ignore the incursions or act against them). It takes an immensely clever opponent to outflank an acting party (China). It will be immensely interesting to wait & watch this game of chess. Does India still have the spirit of Kautilya alive in its political gene?
The categories and cases analyzed:
1) Tactical:
(1a) China is counter-challenging building of road along the LAC in Ladakh, by India.
My view … it’s a possible cause. Especially keeping in mind that Karakoram Highway is within the reach from the point of current conflict, of all modern Indian Guns. And it would be any sensible military strategist’s first action in a 2-front theatre – choke the juggler vein between the two. Flow of weapons, men and materials from China to Pakistan (Pakistan will never withstand a prolonged theatre) could be halted completed by firing a few bombs from India’s territory and sabotaging Karakoram highway at multiple junctions.
(1b) China has internal strife & Sino-Indian border issue (China claims India is inscribing into their territory on Sino-Indian maps) is a good diversion for the public which is still reeling under the heavy hand of Chinese state through the Corona Pandemic;
My view … Cannot be omitted as a possibility, because there are numerous facts on ground that support this hypothesis, but its proportional contribution in a multi-pronged strategy would rather be low. Think – Why a nation (China) or a leader (Xi Jinping) fighting on six fronts - South China Sea, Australian & Sino-Canadian hostility [post retention of Huawei CFO], Taiwanese hostility, Hong Kong rebellion, US Trade war, Pandemic stress; would open another front with India? One has to be a delusional Fuhrer to do it. Xi seems more sensible, but then who knows what happens behind the great wall!
2) Strategic:
(2a) China wants to dominate India.
My view … it is apparent. I am rather surprised at the naiveté of prime time anchors, who claim to have discovered China’s desire to dominate India. Start by asking, “Would India not desire to dominate China, given a chance”? Who does not want to dominate others in geopolitical arena? In a survival-of-the-fittest game, those capable of adroitly dominating, but not doing it are not worthy of power. Every nation of global standing desires to influence decision-making in other nations for its benefit (domination). Some do it economically, others politically or militarily and still others by just being like a common pain to all, after an unhygienic meal. I dissuaded myself from giving examples, as my readers can imagine these themselves.
(2b) China wants to gnaw as much territory as possible.
My view … ask yourself one question – why now? Why would it do so, when it knows that the nationalist Government in Delhi, will be sweated into a corner? Pushing a positively inclined (towards China) Government into a cliffhanger does not seem to be a great strategy. So we keep this case for later discussion as this is the basis of my personal analysis.
(2c) Deter India from cosying up to US or the Quad (US, China, Japan, Australia).
My view … even a small time corporate strategist understands that shoving or scare-mongering a fence-sitter will only push him to jump over to other side. Makes no strategic sense. I do not expect the Chinese to be imbecile strategists.
(2d) Strategic diplomatic coercion (proposed by Shekhar Gupta of 'The Print' dated 27th June 2020 in ‘Cut the Clutter’ & ‘National Interest’).
My view … trying to occupy territory & running into episodes costing itself more, if not as much as India, would be underestimating Chinese capability to think through possible outcomes. I wonder, after getting a punch back in its face and being booed by every major power (including ‘The Quad’) and pushing all its neighbours, besides the Quad into a huddle would really be a bad strategy. I do not see any Chinese diplomatic coercion possible. Quite on the contrary, the world’s view about China, if at all indicates of lack of diplomatic finesse among Chinese. They have reduced, if not lost, patient ears in Delhi amongst the business or political community. Secondly, let’s get down to nuts and bolts – China can never have a sustained victory of any kind against India – thanks to Himalayas. Missile hits will be reciprocal & could lead to dismantling of communist rule. This is so apparent in China’s strict adherence to no use of fire arms. In fact a reciprocal no-fire-arms policy has been to India’s detriment, because India is very good at mountain warfare & cross-border hits – something it has been professionally doing and damaging Pakistan for about a decade now. Secondly, India is too big, with an internalized economy (exports are paltry vis-à-vis GDP) to be coerced into anything. On the contrary, China only stands to lose, if trade is impacted India will only reduce its trade imbalance grossly skewed in China’s favour. Irrespective of concern showcased, a pragmatic Russia is happy selling arms to both the opposing parties – China & India. It’s benefit in a conflict is self-explanatory. Weapons are insurance policies – the more is the fear the better are their sales. So it will maintain its politico-military support to both India and China. Thereby, being a relevant balancing power in an eastwardly tilted world. Diplomatic coercion happens when multiple players pressurize a nation to gulp down its throat a strike on its sovereignty or politico-military esteem. Pakistan’s situation post Kargil’99 is a good example. In this case, India is evidently receiving sympathy, while a hissing China is booed.
(2e) China & Pakistan have teamed up to push India militarily.
My view … it is possible. Especially keeping in mind a combination of this case with a previous one described in (1a). It could be a request from Pakistan Military asking China to engage India within its means to reduce the military pressure India has upped on LOC. Though there have been some engagements elsewhere, nevertheless, choice of Ladakh, as the theatre for action cannot be ignored.
(2f) Strategic tickling - pinch India & see its reaction to make a weighed policy for future.
My view … it is possible. Cost in lives lost might not be a major concern for an authoritative state like China. Xi is not required to win a general election!
3) Psycho-economical:
(3a) China wants to show India down. And thereafter somehow stagnate it.
My view … I wonder, do we really need China to stagnate? Think about it. We are good at doing this without their help. In fact the impact of Chinese incursions would only gel India together to beat the heat. Left alone, we were rather heading for a stagflation. A take-it-easy, happy-go-lucky nation (India) busy on their Chinese smartphones & Televisions have suddenly got a fire (Boycott Chinese) to douse jointly. Every second Indian is running around with his own bucket of actions. I have firmly believed that the only nation with potential to be great superpower other than US is India. Our individualism, self-motivation and capability to embrace ambiguity being raison d’etre. We just need to cross the threshold, beyond which they start yielding exponential returns. We are close, but not yet there.
(3b) China wanted to deter India from inviting companies wanting to disembark their shores.
My view … it is very much possible. I would say it is most sensible reason for a country whose power and status of an eminent super power is dependent on economics and exports. ‘Factory of the world’ tag is the most coveted tag China has which has allowed it immense influence in all nations including Europe and US. This, therefore is China’s Achilles heel – the vulnerability that they cannot afford to be bulldozed. By stirring the Sino-Indian conflict soup, they are successfully drawing all Indian attention away from attracting factories and investments from China to India, while concurrently drawing western operators & investors away from India – as a place in chaos and edging a serious conflict with China. Distances matter. China’s economic power houses are very far away & unconcerned with Sino-Indian Ladakh theatre. They also knew that talkative & argumentative Indians (including me) will reiterate Sino-Indian conflict so much to make it a job in itself. I need confession the only difference between well-meaning Indians and meaningless Indians is – that the former (like me), write analytical papers thinking, “What if the strategists in Delhi, missed something, let me write my analysis to provide them cue on all possibilities”; while the latter think, “let me educate others on strategic thinking”. Either way, we speak, argue & write till we are self-hypnotized or the topic crumbles dead from monotony.
4) Reactionary:
(4a) China is doing this because Indian Home Minister announced India shall take Aksai Chin back from China.
My view … bleakly possible. Chinese are not expected to ground their strategy on Indian political rhetoric, which they understand well. Nonetheless, it is possible that China decided to give a low cost signal to India to refrain from adventure.
(4b) China is itself feeling insecure both internally (Pandemic, Hong Kong & Taiwan) and externally (US, strong willed India) and hence bullying its way (proposed by Chinese Experts in Washington).
My view … it is impossible. Such behavioral insecurities are valid for individuals, not nations.
(4c) Occupying some Indian territory could be a Dokhlam revenge
My view … very much possible. China had to recede losing face globally. Because while China fully manages information diffusion within China, it has no control on the opinion making outside of China. India pushing China back – to protect its protectorate (Bhutan), needed an appropriate revenge – that of disputed territory being nibbled by China along LAC in strategic area of Ladakh. This is what any sensible superpower claimant would do. Does not surprise me at all. India should have expected this and not be carried away with Wuhan tea drinking or Mamallapuram bonhomie. I bet Indian military strategists of any sensible caliber would already be thinking (quite alike) – now that China occupied some disputed no-man’s land, India will act alike in another sector to ultimately square off to pre-conflict positions. Indeed, if Indian does not do that, it would not have anything to negotiate on.
5) Habitual:
(5a) China is in the habit of nibbling away adjoining lands and other such resources that are not cared for or whiling away
My view … it is possible. This is a national behavior. It might seem far-fetched but cultural memes are far deeply embedded into collective national psyche.
(5b) China has been habituated to India's wonted reticence (understating itself diplomatically), its pacifism (disinclination to fight), its ambiguity (in thinking) & its wavering attitude in action. Actions (August) of Modi Government have jolted it into action. They underestimated India.
My view … very much possible. They suddenly realized that India is trying to cut threads in which it was strategically entangled. The umbilical cord with Pakistan, which was choking an agitated & energetic young India to asphyxiation, was surgically chopped off on 5th August 2019. This stunned Chinese. And they decided to take strategic steps to defend Karakoram and Aksai Chin.
Aforementioned are fifteen (15) different cases made till date. Besides the analysis provided above. I add my own case – Techno-strategic, which has not been discussed till date.
6) Techno-strategic:
My view … Realizing that while Himalayas will not let China have a sustained victory on anyone across (Nepal, Bhutan or all the more huge India), technology development is happening at such a rapid speed that very soon non-human means of establishing and guarding the borders will get developed. US, Russia and China itself, need it more than India or anyone else (owing to large Borders). With such technology components already available, though not installed. Example – Boeing’s Project–28 (of electronic fence between US & Mexico for certain sectors). Our own proposal (from my Company) to Ministry of Defense to build an electronic fence on the border, enabling detection, signaling (including high decibel signal) besides control room alerts and satellite imagery can be coupled with automated detection and weapon firing – all autonomous, could hopefully be considered. We do it or not, it is happening. Such technologies will automatically harden the borders on 24x7 basis.
Therefore, whatsoever is occupied by whosoever, will be their factual & geographical territory. These are going to the last few years for China to gnaw into territory especially at strategic junctions before the LAC hardens. India’s rising economic and global stature would also enable India to better protect its boundaries. Thus they decided to gnaw whatsoever they can before a hardened LAC becomes a reality. Which both the nations will accept if not today, another half a decade later. On an optimistic note – China might even want to hereafter resolve the border dispute more actively.
Aforementioned is the only sensible explanation to the question I posed in (2b)
CUMULATIVE ANALYSIS
Cumulatively, re-ordering the detected positive cases & stitching them into a chronometric storyline, China seemed desirous of causing the below mentioned. What actually is occurring is mentioned in next section.
Ownership[6]: Dokhlam revenge needed to be taken & strategic pinching of India was needed to be done by Chinese to check the reaction and formulate a weighed future long term policy. There would be a zone chosen for real action & other zones as decoys. The real action zone seems to be in Ladakh, while Sikkim, Tawang & Indo-Nepal-China tri-zone were tactical distraction. Indo-Nepal-China tri-zone issue though done by Nepal is manifestly at China’s behest, as I have no belief in miracles and geopolitical co-incidents. Simultaneously, China is in the habit of gnawing away territories that are ill-protected or resources that are whiling away.
Knowing that high altitude areas are not patrolled in winters, they acted on early onset of spring (March-April) and occupied the areas that where otherwise no-man’s land in Pangong Tso & Galwan Valley which was patrolled and frequented by both the parties regularly. While occupying these areas, China, habituated to India's wavering attitude towards action in last 60 years, underestimated India.
Quantitative[7] change desired by China: Nibble away territory in the sensitive and strategic sector of Ladakh. Deter India from inviting investments and western companies that might desire to move out of China impacting there export, economy & standing as the ‘factory-of-the-world’.
Qualitative[8] change aimed by China: China does see a rival in India and wants to dominate in a Sino-Indian relationship. So it is counter-challenging the road India build.
Geo-ambient[9] change aimed by China: China certainly felt that a Sino-Indian conflict would divert its public opinion from internal strife and other fronts (pandemic & economic) where it is faltering & gel a divided nation. Teaming up with Pakistan made sense and hence the zone chosen was one that is strategically important to Chinese as well as Pakistanis owing to its closeness to India-China-Pak border & Karakoram highway. An incursion & occupation of no-man’s land (or disputed land) would also send a clear message deterring India from rearing any Aksai Chin ambitions. Equally important was the desire to occupy maximum in the most strategic locations before the LAC is hardened by technology and economy of a rising India.
What China ended up achieving by now?
It occupies some high-altitude no-man’s land that is tactically important in mountainous battles and overseas the newly built Indian Border Road, which can be destroyed by China easily at multiple locations. But the Karakoram highway is still in easy Indian reach. Therefore, as of now, they seem to have created a counter strength but realize that their own weakness is not eliminated. Additionally, they would be naïve not to anticipate Indian counter occupation in Sikkim areas, which are more important for India, owing to chicken’s neck to subsequently trade off in a settlement & genuine disengagement & return to pre-April status. There is another aspect, we Indians will never know – May be this area has been occupied by Chinese to square off another area India might have occupied quietly. I am conducive to such a possibility, because I do think that Indians have not or could not similarly, occupy no-man’s land in other territories. Thinking this impossible would be understating our own capabilities.
Unanticipated outcomes for China: It has opened an otherwise quite front with India. It has forced India to considering Quad more seriously. RIC will only remain a grievance redressal platform for India & China, as Russia is the only nation that Indians and Chinese might allow to silently mediate.
China would have thought that India would run to US & UN with a complaint letter and that’s it. Most of these platforms are ineffective, Chinese knew. What they surely did not anticipate is India’s resolve to approach none & figure out a resolution, on their own. India’s courteous refusal of US’s mediation offer and proactive self-initiated action has brought China at par with Pakistan in terms of dealing with it. Indian Prime Minister on being offered mediation between India & Pakistan by US President, had sagaciously responded, “we do not want to burden US with petty issues of our own”. So it probably is a shocker to China. As India now stands at par with China & has clearly stated its capability to seek no allies for counter-punching a bully in its face. This has also raised India’s stature globally - a counter impact undesired by Chinese. It has one more worry & seventh front opened with Sino-Indian conflict. Politically, militarily and diplomatically, China’s objectives of dominating India, have all been defeated. Economically, it has woken India up to the depth to which they occupy Indian markets. Counter measures will happen – effecting their market shares subsequently – not only in India but even abroad.
China has got a red nose for the second time, first time was in Dokhlam. It lost probable 40-45 soldiers in the hand-to-hand combat in Galwan. This is a sensible estimate, as eye witness accounts state that one young Indian Gurtej Singh had cancelled 9 Chinese soldiers, before falling martyr. I have no reasons to believe that all others taken together would have not deleted 30 more. While 20 of our own were martyred.
While the Chinese might be overly insecure vis-à-vis factories and investments shifting to India. I would not even bother about it. The reason being that I firmly believe that China’s market and infrastructure was sizably better and not many will actually shift to India. So their fears might have been grossly exaggerated.
The other consequence will be inevitable gelling up of the other sino-pained neighbours of China. An encirclement of China is more probable now than it ever was before May 2020. Furthermore, China has driven into a corner - a positively inclined & neutral Government in Delhi. They have lost a friend in Delhi – Mr. Narendra Modi.
China might be in for more surprises. (a) India might enliven Tibet issue again; (b) reduce trade balance substantially; (c) and given an opportunity, we are capable of developing unmanned self-guarding electronic borders (guarded from up to 5 km away (inside Indi’s territory) from the electronic fence and thus cannot be sabotaged by enemy behind the lines. And we can do it faster than Chinese can. Thereby,
Hardening LAC.
Word Count : ~3600
Endnotes:
[1] In context of this article it means localized in geography and time.
[2] That which has clearly stated quantitative (measurable) objectives with their risks, purpose, place, cost and time of accomplishing.
[3] Psychological has been clubbed with economical because the ultimate objective of psychological causes is to influence the dominated party for extraction of resources from them more than the dominating party’s fair share in a transaction amongst the two.
[4] Reaction guided by emotional connect or abhorrence.
[5] A habit. Like territorial kleptomania – a memetic habit of gnawing others’ land or resources whiling away
[6] Relating to effect on the impacting party, impacted party and the witnesses
[7] Relating to numerical or calibrated & comparative assessment
[8] Relating to properties that are non-numerical – includes strategic changes
[9] Relating to locational aspects and environs (milieu) of the entity (party) impacting or impacted
